Showing posts with label minor myths. Show all posts
Showing posts with label minor myths. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Curry's Review

 Climate Etc.'s "Week in Review" function is getting more and more erratic, ignoring big stories, trumpeting horribly unprofessional and ill-thought-out editorials, and in general looking more and more like an archaeological record of the self-reinforcing power of cognitive dissonance.
I am trying to figure out what Mann is trying to accomplish with these lawsuits.  I guess he is hoping to intimidate people into not saying negative things about him?
The lack of common sense -- and lack of empathy -- expressed here is startling. Evidently tribal feelings in Dr. Curry have reached a point where she can't comprehend why a person would fight back against slander and defamation.

She highlights a truly God-awful article,  "The Moral Downside of Climate Change." Major parts (not the ones she chooses to quote) rehash a bundle of myths and lies:
It seems likely, after all, that what we are witnessing in the furor over climate change is a rerun of the wildly off-base population explosion announced in the 1960s, or the brief romance with a threatened ice age in the next decade, or the treatment of pregnancy as a disease, or the pressing need for safe sex, or the horrors of growing up in a world in which not everyone respects and affirms our every choice. . . . the actions taken at best waste time, energy and resources and at worst either make the problem worse or create new problems in their wake.
 One wonders if Curry believes condoms are "a waste of time and resources" or if she clings to the discredited myth that scientists in the 70s predicted a new ice age. And speaking of the ice, it's time to spin the free-fall up north:
Depending on which data set you look at, the Arctic sea ice extent is approaching or has surpassed the record minimum extent (for the period since 1979) in 2007.  There are even predictions of an ice free Arctic Ocean by the end of Sept.  I’ll do a post later in Sept on “what is going on and what does all this mean.”   But in the mean time, here is highly confident prediction:  the Arctic Ocean will NOT be ice free by the end of Sept.  In fact, nearly all of thin and loosely consolidated ice has already melted (helped along by the big cyclonic storm in early Aug).  The remaining ice is consolidated near Greenland and the Canadian archipelago, and is at high latitudes where the autumnal cooling is well underway.  So I would suspect that there will be an earlier than usual sea ice minimum this year, with the minimum not getting much lower.
Wow, desperate much? Where are the predictions of an ice-free Arctic Ocean this year to be found? In this one paragraph we have:

1. A straw man fallacy, trying to refocus our attention on the ridiculous idea that the ice will vanish this year, a position I can find no one endorsing.
2. A desperate stab at reassuring her readership that although the ice numbers are presently in free-fall, no doubt everything will be back to normal.

It's shocking (to me at least) that promising "an earlier than usual sea ice minimum this year" is not really substantially different than Goddard's supposed "early recovery" of the sea ice. And when a full professor is starting to echo Steve Goddard, it's time to pour the whiskey and vodka down the drain and take a serious hard look at yourself.

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Minor myths: Do some economists think global warming will be beneficial?


The cost of climate change. Interactive version here.

Several times recently, I've read or had it put to me that we don't know if global warming is going to be harmful or costly, and, specifically, that some economists think it may produce a net benefit.

To investigate this claim, I went to Google Scholar with the search terms "cost climate change." I ignored any article that wasn't about the cost of climate change, and also ignored any article not either written by a trained economist or published in their literature. I took only articles from 2009 onwards, picking up where this interesting study left off (Tol looks at 211 estimates of the cost of climate change, finding eight negative estimates (out of 211) from the work of just three authors, including Tol himself. He concludes -- and, as background, he is unquestionably the most respected and accomplished of the "skeptical" economists -- "Firstly, greenhouse gas emission reduction today is justified. Even the most conservative assumption lead to positive estimates of the social cost of carbon (cf. Table 1) and the Pigou tax is thus greater than zero.")

So onwards towards the present:
1. I quickly found out Martin L. Weitzman is not sanguine:
It is difficult to imagine what +10C–20°C might mean for life on Earth, but such high temperatures have not been seen for hundreds of millions of years and such a rate of change over a few centuries would be unprecedented even on a timescale of billions of years. Global average warming of 10°C–20°C masks tremendous local and seasonal variation, which can be expected to produce temperature increases greater than this at particular times in particular places. Because these hypothetical temperature changes would be geologically instantaneous, they would effectively destroy planet Earth as we know it. At a mini- mum such temperatures would trigger mass species extinctions and biosphere ecosystem disintegration matching or exceeding the immense planetary die-offs associated in Earth’s history with a handful of previous geoenvironmental mega-catastrophes. There exist some truly terrifying consequences of mean temperature increases +10°C–20°C, such as disintegration of Greenland’s and at least the western part of the Antarctic’s ice sheets with dramatic raising of sea level by perhaps thirty meters or so, critically important changes in ocean heat transport systems associated with thermohaline circulations, complete disruption of weather, moisture and precipitation patterns at every planetary scale, highly consequential geographic changes in freshwater availability, and regional desertification.
All of the above-mentioned horrifying examples of climate- change mega-disasters are incontrovertibly possible on a timescale of centuries.
Geez, Martin, thanks for the pep talk.

2. Burniaux et al, writing for the OCED, are less terrified but equally convinced:
The benefits of mitigation policies are difficult to quantify and fully monetise. Nevertheless, OECD analysis finds that when non-market impacts and risks of inaction are factored in, ambitious mitigation action is found to be economically rational – i.e. to result in net benefits – at the global level. This is the case even though the analysis does not factor in the co-benefits from mitigation action (e.g. in terms of human health, energy security or biodiversity), which previous OECD analysis estimated to be large (Burniaux et al. 2008).
 3. I found Richard Tol had done another meta-analysis:
I review the literature on the economic impacts of climate change, an externality that is unprecedentedly large, complex, and uncertain. Only 14 estimates of the total damage cost of climate change have been published, a research effort that is in sharp contrast to the urgency of the public debate and the proposed expenditure on greenhouse gas emission reduction. These estimates show that climate change initially improves economic welfare. However, these benefits are sunk. Impacts would be predominantly negative later in the century. Global average impacts would be comparable to the welfare loss of a few percent of income, but substantially higher in poor countries. Still, the impact of climate change over a century is comparable to economic growth over a few years. There are over 200 estimates of the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions. The uncertainty about the social cost of carbon is large and right-skewed. For a standard discount rate, the expected value is $50/tC, which is much lower than the price of carbon in the European Union but much higher than the price of carbon elsewhere. Current estimates of the damage costs of climate change are incomplete, with positive and negative biases. Most important among the missing impacts are the indirect effects of climate change on economic development; large-scale biodiversity loss; low-probability, high-impact scenarios; the impact of climate change on violent conflict; and the impacts of climate change beyond 2100. From a welfare perspective, the impact of climate change is problematic because population is endogenous, and because policy analyses should separate impatience, risk aversion, and inequity aversion between and within countries.
4. Bollen et al revisit a longtime hobbyhorse of IT, the additional benefits to human health and welfare of cutting fossil fuel burning, a major cause of asthma, lung cancer and other respiratory diseases. They think the air pollution benefits may be the larger benefit! But, again, there's no suggestion than global warming isn't a significantly costly event:
We attempt to cover at least part of the existing gap in the literature by assessing how costs and benefits of technologies and strategies that jointly tackle these two environmental problems can best be balanced. By using specific technological options that cut down local air pollution, e.g. related to particulate emissions, one may concurrently reduce CO2 emissions and thus contribute to diminishing global climate change. Inversely, some of the long-term climate change strategies simultaneously improve the quality of air in the short run. We have extended the well-established MERGE model by including emissions of particulate matter, and show that integrated environmental policies generate net global welfare benefits. We also demonstrate that the discounted benefits of local air pollution reduction significantly outweigh those of global climate change mitigation, at least by a factor of 2, but in most cases of our sensitivity analysis much more. Still, we do not argue to only restrict energy policy today to what should be our first priority, local air pollution control, and wait with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, we propose to design policies that simultaneously address these issues, as their combination creates an additional climate change bonus. As such, climate change mitigation proves an ancillary benefit of air pollution reduction, rather than the other way around.
5. Hill et al, who are primarily concerned with analyzing the utility of biofuels, cleverly use estimates of the cost of CCS (carbon capture and storage) to set an upper limit on carbon costs:
We generate a monetary cost for GHG emissions based on independent estimates of carbon mitigation costs, carbon market prices, and the social cost of carbon. Carbon mitigation (capture and storage) costs for an integrated gasification combined-cycle electricity generating plant are $92–$147 Mg−1 C (18); we use the midpoint of this range, $120 Mg−1 C. This estimate is in the range of recent prices on the European carbon market [€23–28 Mg−1 CO2, or U.S. $133–$162 Mg−1 C at an exchange rate of $1.58 €−1 in July 2008, and €18–23 Mg−1 CO2, or U.S. $88–$112 Mg−1 C at an exchange rate of $1.33 €−1 in October 2008] (molecular weight ratio of CO2:C = 44:12). It is also within the range of estimates for the “social cost of carbon,” which represents the expected future damages from enhanced climate change (e.g., damages from sea level rise, increased storm intensity, and crop losses from more intensive drought). The mean estimate of the social cost of carbon from peer-reviewed studies was $43 Mg−1 C (19), although there was large variation in the estimates from below $0 to >$300 Mg−1 C. The large variation in estimates occurs largely because of disagreement on how to weigh future costs and benefits relative to the present (“discounting”) and how to weigh costs and benefits accruing to poor and rich countries (“equity weights”). In addition, there are large uncertainties about climate forcing impacts and future human adaptability.
 6. Anthoff, Hepburn, and Tol (him again!) find that equity-weighting increases the estimated damages of climate change. What is equity weighting? I have no idea (the downside of wading through the economists' literature). My usual approach is useless -- there's no Wikipedia page. At any rate, they use a damages estimate that is positive, based on Tol's earlier work.
Climate change will give rise to different impacts in different countries, and different countries have different levels of development. Equity-weighted estimates of the (marginal) impact of greenhouse gas emissions reflect these differences. This paper analyses the impact of equity weighting on the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions, and reaches four main conclusions. First, equity-weighted estimates are substantially higher than estimates without equity-weights; equity-weights may even change the sign of the social cost estimates. Second, estimates differ by two orders of magnitude depending on the region to which the equity weights are normalised. Third, equity-weighted estimates are sensitive to the resolution of the impact estimates. Depending on the assumed intra-regional income distribution, estimates may be more than twice as high if national rather than regional impacts are aggregated. Fourth, variations in the assumed inequality aversion have different impacts in different scenarios, not only because different scenarios have different emissions and hence warming, but also because different scenarios have different income differences, different growth rates, and different vulnerabilities.
 7. Ackerman et al feel existing estimates of the economic damages of climate change systematically underestimate the problem:
The integrated assessment models (IAMs) that economists use to analyze the expected costs and benefits of climate policies frequently suggest that the “optimal” policy is to go slowly and to do relatively little in the near term to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We trace this finding to the contestable assumptions and limitations of IAMs. . . . A better approach to climate policy, drawing on recent research on the economics of uncertainty, would reframe the problem as buying insurance against catastrophic, low-probability events. Policy decisions should be based on a judgment concerning the maximum tolerable increase in temperature and/or carbon dioxide levels given the state of scientific understanding. The appropriate role for economists would then be to determine the least-cost global strategy to achieve that target. While this remains a demanding and complex problem, it is far more tractable and epistemically defensible than the cost-benefit comparisons attempted by most IAMs. 
8. Anthoff and Tol are back, "Discounting for Climate Change":
. . . However, if we probabilistically constrain the parameters to values that are implied by observed behaviour, we find that the expected social cost of carbon, corrected for uncertainty and inequity, is approximate 60 US dollar per metric tonne of carbon (or roughly $17 per tonne of CO2) under the assumption that catastrophic risk is zero. 
. . . the problem with that being that catastrophic risk isn't zero. In any case, again the cost is positive.

9.Heltberg et al don't give us a number, but they don't give any hint they think climate change will be of net benefit in "Addressing human vulnerability to climate change: Toward a ‘no-regrets’ approach":

Recent evidence and predictions indicate that climate changes are accelerating and will lead to wide-ranging shifts in climate variables. There will be changes in the mean and variance of rainfall and temperature, extreme weather events, food and agriculture production and prices, water availability and access, nutrition and health status. The most adverse impacts are predicted in the developing world because of geographic exposure, reliance on climate sensitive sectors, low incomes, and weak adaptive capacity. Socio-economic impacts, though generally not well- understood, are likely to be profound and will impact humans through a variety of direct and indirect pathways (IPCC, 2007; Cline, 2007; Stern, 2007). The indirect risks are often hard to predict (they are the consequences of consequences) but could have the worst impacts.
 10. Jamet and Corfee-Morlot (love those French names) round out our top ten with a nice review: "Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change":

On the whole, estimates of the global impact of climate change have not changed much over the last 10 years according to the IPCC (Figure 3). However, the Stern review estimates are much larger than in other studies. As already mentioned, this is mainly due to a low discount rate, and to a lesser extent to new information regarding the impacts (Nordhaus, 2007a; Dasgupta, 2007). Nevertheless, use of a low discount rate may involuntarily yield more plausible estimates than those in the rest of the literature (Weitzman, 2007). This is in part because there are large uncertainties on the impacts of climate change, which are explained in more detail in the following section.

So what have we learned from this exercise? For my part I am reminded again that it is much easier to be a liar than to defend the truth. It's easy for a denier to causally toss off the assertion that some economists think climate change will be of net benefit. Maybe they are thinking of Lomborg (who supports a carbon tax, and anyhow is not actually an economist) or Tol (who is also on record supporting a carbon tax.) Maybe they are just repeating something they've heard; maybe they think it sounds plausible and no one is likely to check. But in any case the misinformation is the work of a moment; fact-checking it takes weary hours.

At any rate: economists more or less universally believe that the impact of global warming will be a net negative. They differ as to the magnitude of the damages expected, but for the most part they are in broad agreement with the climate scientists that global warming on a business as usual pathway will be expensive and destructive in the best case and utterly catastrophic at the worst.

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Carbon price passes in Australia

Baby steps:

The carbon plan, if passed by the Senate, would see Australia join the European Union and New Zealand with national emissions trading schemes, while the United States and Japan have smaller regional schemes.
The government and the Greens hope the carbon tax will reignite momentum for a global emissions reduction agreement at climate talks in Durban, South Africa, in December.
The above is a very partial list. India last year passed a coal tax which is estimated to have raised $555 million in its first year. That's India -- one of those poor, fast-growing, regardless-of-what-we-do-they will-never-do-anything places. And they've moved further down a path to a comprehensive carbon price than we have in North America.

China, though, with its new coal plant every week -- surely China would never pass a carbon tax.

BEIJING, May 11 - China could impose a carbon tax as soon as 2012, and officials have proposed it start from 10 yuan ($1.46) to 20 yuan per tonne of carbon dioxide, a Chinese newspaper said on Tuesday.
The Chinese-language Economic Information Daily said officials and experts from the Ministry of Finance and other state agencies have been studying how to introduce a tax aimed at curbing carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels.
Huh. Maybe we need to rethink this notion that developing countries will not act on global warming, even if the rich world steps up.

South Korea also seems to be moving towards an emissions trading scheme:

The National Assembly is expected to pass by December a bill for the proposed emission trading scheme, or ETS, Park Chun Kyoo, director general of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth overseeing climate change policy, said in an interview.
“Prospects for the bill appear quite healthy as it has backing from the ruling and opposition parties,” said Victoria Cuming, senior analyst at Bloomberg New Energy Finance in London.

Sunday, September 4, 2011

Minor myths: the Galileo Gambit

Him, not you, Tony.



From the Rationalwiki:

The Galileo gambit, or Galileo fallacy, is the notion that if you are vilified for your ideas, you must be right. It refers to Galileo Galilei's famous persecution at the hands of the Roman Catholic Church for his defence of heliocentrism in the face of the orthodox Biblical literalism of the day. People use this argument repeatedly in response to serious criticisms that more often than not they just don't understand.


Amen. And there are a few other salient points about the example of Galileo we ought bear in mind. Galileo was a scientific producer, not primarily a critic (although he could write a mean polemic when he had a mind, but little of that work has stood the test of time). He designed his own instruments, and with those instruments he made observations, and it was in explaining those observations that he came into conflict with the church.

This is the case with most of the iconoclastic scientists to whom we are invited to compare Monckton, Soon, Spencer et al: Galileo and Darwin and Newton and Einstein and so on. "Skeptics" cite them because they challenged the consensus. They pay less attention to the fact that they did so by providing compelling explanations for observed facts, not by ridiculing the existing theories as failures.

This is not the case with most deniers. Compare the goals of "The Galileo Movement," an anti-climate-science outfit, on their website:

1. Scientific untruths

Start following the money yourself. Begin replacing climate guilt and fear with reassurance, peace and security.

Summary...
2. Science facts & futility

Discover truth by understanding real-world facts about Nature and science. Reclaim Nature's clarity, beauty, harmony, order and inspiration.

Summary...
3. The cost to you & hypocrisy

Why pay dearly for nothing? Discover how to protect the environment by maintaining economic security, choices and freedom - while saving money.

Summary...
4. Restoring morality & justice

Discover for yourself peace, fairness, ease and trust by really caring for the environment.

Read more...
5. Protecting freedom

Belonging to the human community - rediscovering choice, responsibility, protection, hope.


In this blizzard of highly emotive verbiage, they manage to mention peace, money, freedom, caring, choice, beauty, harmony, order, and inspiration, but not evidence, argument, observation, analysis, theory, reason, logic, deduction or risk.

Galileo was also a seriously studious professional academic:

Although he seriously considered the priesthood as a young man, he enrolled for a medical degree at the University of Pisa at his father's urging. He did not complete this degree, but instead studied mathematics.[16]

Galileo was also studious of disegno, a term encompassing fine art, and in 1588 attained an instructor position in the Accademia delle Arti del Disegno in Florence, teaching perspective and chiaroscuro. Being inspired by the artistic tradition of the city and the works of the Renaissance artists, Galileo acquired an aesthetic mentality. While a young teacher at the Accademia, he began a lifelong friendship with the Florentine painter Cigoli, who included Galileo's lunar observations in one of his paintings.[17][18]

In 1589, he was appointed to the chair of mathematics in Pisa. In 1591 his father died and he was entrusted with the care of his younger brother Michelagnolo. In 1592, he moved to the University of Padua, teaching geometry, mechanics, and astronomy until 1610.[19] During this period Galileo made significant discoveries in both pure fundamental science (for example, kinematics of motion and astronomy) as well as practical applied science (for example, strength of materials and improvement of the telescope). His multiple interests included the study of astrology, which at the time was a discipline tied to the studies of mathematics and astronomy.


By the time of the heliocentrism controversy that brought Galileo into conflict with the church, in 1616, he had been teaching at university for twenty-eight years. He was an expert in multiple fields and he made substantial contributions to physics, astronomy, mathematics, materials engineering and optics. He was not the equivalent of a skeptic blogger whose scientific education consists of daily visits to WUWT. He was not a self-taught auteur. He was a widely acknowledged genius that had been churning out original scientific work for several decades.

Nor was Galileo always right. Forget trusting people because they are like Galileo, if you took the side of the actual, literal Galileo against his contemporaries you'd spend a lot of time being wrong.

* Galileo thought the Sun caused the tides (in deference to any "skeptics" visiting: it's the moon).
* Galileo thought planetary orbits were perfectly circular; he rejected Kepler's (correct) theory of elliptical orbits.
* Galileo denied that comets were physical objects, arguing that they were mere reflections or optical illusions, like a rainbow.

If even actually being Galileo doesn't make you right, then comparing yourself to the great scientist is not going to cut the mustard.

Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Yet another independent line of evidence for global warming


Scientists looked at changes in the length of hundreds of glaciers measured over the course of the twentieth century. Money quote:

The temperature record obtained from glacier fluctuations confirms the pronounced warming of the twentieth century, giving a global cumulative warming of 0.94 ± 0.31 K over the period 1830–2000 and a cumulative warming of 0.84 ± 0.35 K over the period 1600–2000.


The pronounced warming of the last hundred years is old news to most of us, but sixty percent of climate deniers still think the world is not warming at all. Among many others, there circulates the myth that climate science is merely a collection of computer models:

"More Trouble For Global Warming Alarmists":

Because global warming alarmism is based almost entirely on computer climate models rather than, you know, actual scientific observation. The models have already been shown to be unable to accurately predict historical climate changes on a backward looking basis for periods in which we have observational data. Now, they are once again proven wrong. Garbage in; garbage out.


"Joe Dallas" repeats the meme:

The alarmists’ claims are based entirely on hypothetic­al indirect consequenc­es of additional CO2. But these alleged indirect effects are not based on empirical observatio­n, they are merely hypothesiz­ed by the alarmists and incorporat­ed into their computer models. For a long time, we have known that the models’ prediction­s are contradict­ed by empirical observatio­n. In the world of science, this is called refutation of a theory, but global warming exists in the realms of politics and religion, not science.


"Abovetopsecret," a favorite hangout of mass murderer/climate denier Anders Behring Breivik, ties this myth to Roy Spenser's latest modelling misadventure:


In order for human emissions to cause any real change in climate, alarmist scientists have to incorporate “feedback” mechanisms in their models that greatly amplify the known effects of human CO2 warming.

These “feedback” mechanisms are entirely hypothetical constructs which are incorporated into alarmist computer models.


The fact that this commenter, like so many others, uses a paper that is no more than curve fitting a crude and poorly executed model, to criticize the use of computer models, is an indication of how ill-thought-out (or deceptive) these criticisms are. And the hypocrisy is widespread. Not just Roy Spencer's recent paper but any sort of computer model that produces results deniers like garners almost delirious praise, with all their former skepticism of "computer models" temporarily forgotten.

The truth of the matter is that scientists are still very much in the business of observing the physical world. Take just one variable, global temperatures over time, and you will find scientists measuring it in every conceivable way you can think of and more than a few that never occurred to you. A partial and incomplete list:

!. Direct temperature measurements at fixed sites.
2. Changes in the ranges of plant and animal life.
3. Changes in sea level.
4. Changes in glacier size, mass, and distribution.
5. Direct measurements of outgoing radiation and incoming radiation at the top of the atmosphere.
6. Changes in the shape of the earth (really!)
7. Changes in plant growth (like tree ring data).
8. The isotopic composition of snow, corals, and stalactites.
9. Sediment core records of Arctic lakes.
10. Ice core data.
11. Flood markings.
12. Records of crop and grape harvests.
13. Weather diaries and historical maps.
14. Records documenting the timing and extent of Christian agricultural celebrations.
15. Instrumental records of humidity (which varies directly with temperature).
16. Satellite measurements.

The list goes on and on. All these data sources, like all data, has strengths and weakness and limited resolution. That is not my point. What the data proves and what it doesn't is a discussion for another day. My point is that scientists measure things, and climate scientists measure things a lot -- many different kinds of things, collecting information over large spans of time. Once those data sets exist, computer models become an essential adjunct in understanding the data and what is says about our climate and our future. But let's not lose sight of who is spending long hours at low pay collecting real observations from nature, and who is obsessively mathturbating.